

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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E. O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM, US, UR
SUBJ: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS

TTBT/PNE DELEGATION MESSAGE NO 42

1. SUMMARY. IN WORKING GROUP TWO OCTOBER 10, SAFRONOV
DISCUSSED ARTICLES OF SOVIET DRAFT AND COMPARED THEIR
CONTENT WITH THAT OF US DRAFT PROTOCOL I. WITH RESPECT
TO US PROTOCOL II HE HAD ONLY GENERAL REMARKS. SAID
VERIFICATION MUST BE CARRIED OUT BY MEANS WHICH ARE OWNED
AND OPERATED BY SIDE CARRYING OUT EXPLOSION. TWO SIDES
SHOULD SEEK MEANS TO PROVIDE ASSURANCE EQUIPMENT MEETS NEEDS
OF BOTH. SAFRONOV COMPARED SOVIET DRAFT ARTICLES IV, V, VI,
VII WITH US TEXT. SAID ARTICLE IV HAS TO A CERTAIN EXTENT,
VARIOUS DEGREES OF CORRESPONDENCE WITH US PROPOSALS. HE SAID
ARTICLE IV PARA 2 GENERALLY CORRESPONDS TO FUNCTIONS TO BE
FULFILLED BY DESIGNATED PERSONNEL AS PROPOSED BY US. THE
VOLUME OF TECHNICAL DETAIL IN US DRAFT WAS TOO GREAT AND
THERE WERE SEVERAL DIFFERENCES OF PRINCIPLE BETWEEN TWO SIDES.
SAFRONOV SAID HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY MOROKHOV TO SAY THAT
ACCORDING TO SOVIET LAW THE AREA USED FOR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
IS RESTRICTED AND PERSONS NOT INVOLVED IN PROJECT CANNOT
STAY IN AREA OR TAKE PHOTOS. SOVIET ARTICLE IV PARA 3(C) AND
3(D) REFLECT POINT OF PRINCIPLE MADE EARLIER. THERE WAS NO
NEED TO DISCUSS NOW, BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO INDICATE DIFFERENCE

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OF TWO POINTS OF VIEW. US SIDE WILL RESPOND AT NEXT MEETING

3:00 PM OCTOBER 13. END SUMMARY.

2. FOLLOWING EXCHANGE AS TO PROCEDURES FOR MEETING, IT WAS AGREED SOVIET SIDE WOULD MAKE DETAILED COMMENTS, PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH, ON DRAFT PROTOCOLS. SAFRONOV NOTED THAT PARTS OF US PROTOCOL I HAD BEEN DISCUSSED PREVIOUSLY IN WORKING GROUPS.

3. WITH RESPECT TO US PROTOCOL II, SAFRONOV SAID HIS REMARKS WERE OF A "GLOBAL" CHARACTER, NOT DETAILED. HE SUGGESTED THAT TECHNICAL DETAILS BE DELETED AND AT SAME TIME THE TWO SIDES SHOULD THINK OVER PROBLEM AND FIND SOLUTION. SAFRONOV SAID THAT, IN HIS VIEW, VERIFICATION MUST BE CARRIED OUT BE MEANS WHICH BELONG TO AND ARE OPERATED BY SIDE CARRYING OUT EXPLOSION. PROCEEDING FROM THIS, TWO SIDES COULD THINK ABOUT MEANS TO PROVIDE ASSURANCE THAT EQUIPMENT USED MEETS REQUIREMENTS OF BOTH SIDES.

4. AMONG METHODS WHICH SAFRONOV SAID HE COULD CITE WAS EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON MEANS OF VERIFICATION, OR EXCHANGE OF MEANS THEMSELVES. INFORMATION ON EQUIPMENT AND ITS OPERATION COULD BE ORGANIZED BY PROGRAMS AND METHODS PROPOSED BY VERIFYING SIDE UPON AGREEMENT WITH SIDE CARRYING OUT EXPLOSION. SAFRONOV SAID HE WAS TOLD TO SAY THIS SUGGESTION WAS MADE AD REFERENDUM.

5. SAFRONOV THEN BEGAN A BRIEF AND SUPERFICIAL ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS OF SOVIET PROTOCOL ARTICLES IV, V, VI AND VII.

6. WITH RESPECT TO PARA 1 OF ARTICLE IV, SOVIET SIDE INSISTS THAT DESIGNATED PERSONNEL MUST BE INVITED IN EVERY CASE WHEN YIELD EXCEEDS 150 KILOTONS, BUT FOR EXPLOSIONS WITH YIELD GREATER THAN 100 KILOTONS IT IS UP TO PARTY CONDUCTING EXPLOSION TO DECIDE WHETHER TO INVITE DESIGNATED PERSONNEL. ACCORDING TO US, DESIGNATED PERSONNEL MUST ALWAYS BE INVITED WHEN YIELD IS ABOVE 100 KILOTONS. SAFRONOV SAID HE HAD NOTHING TO ADD TO WHAT HAD BEEN SAID BY MOROKHOV.

7. SAFRONOV SAID IT IS IMPORTANT TO INDICATE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TWO POINTS OF VIEW. ACCORDING TO US, VERIFYING SIDE BRINGS EQUIPMENT AND INSTRUMENTS. USSR PROPOSES SOMETHING QUITE DIFFERENT. IN THE SOVIET VIEW THE VERIFYING PARTY

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CARRIES OUT ITS ACTIVITIES WITH THE HELP OF EQUIPMENT PROVIDED BY THE SIDE CARRYING OUT EXPLOSION. QUESTIONS RELATED TO DETAILS AND METHODS OF TAKING MEASUREMENTS ARE SIMPLE FOR US, AND WE CAN COME TO AGREEMENT IN PRACTICAL WORK.

8. SAFRONOV SAID SUBPARA (3L) OF SOVIET ARTICLE IV COMBINES CONTENT OF SUBPARAS 1, 2, AND 3, OF PARA (B) OF ARTICLE VI OF US DRAFT. SOVIETS BELIEVE THIS PROVIDES DESIGNATED PERSONNEL

LARGER POSSIBILITIES THAN US DRAFT BECAUSE IT CREATES ACCESS TO INITIAL DATA OF OPERATING PARTY AND AT SAME TIME PRECLUDES POSSIBILITY TO GET ACCESS TO INFORMATION NOT NECESSARY FOR VERIFICATION.

9. SAFRONOV SAID SOVIET SUBPARA (F) ARTICLE IV CONCIDES WITH US PARA (G) OF ARTICLE VI. SOVIET SIDE DOES NOT SEE NECESSITY FOR ADDITIONAL PHOTOGRAPHS. SAFRONOV ADDED THAT SOVIET LAWS REQUIRE THAT PERSONS NOT INVOLVED IN PROJECT CANNOT STAY IN AREA OR TAKE PHOTOGRAPHS. MOROKHOV HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO MAKE THIS POINT.

10. SAFRONOV SAID SUBPARA (G) PARA 3 ARTICLE IV IS SOVIET INVENTION.

11. SAFRONOV SAID PARA 4 OF ARTICLE IV REPEATS CONTENTS OF US PARA 4, ARTICLE VI. PARA 5 OF ARTICLE IV IS VERY HELPFUL IN SOLVING A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH DESIGNATED PERSONNEL ENUMERATED IN SOVIET PARA 3 ARTICLE IV. PARA 6 OF ARTICLE IV ESTABLISHES NUMBER OF DESIGNATED PERSONNEL AS DOES US DRAFT.

12. SAFRONOV SAID ARTICLE V "MEETS REQUIREMENTS OF COOPERATION, LICENSING AND REQUIREMENTS OF THE TREATY."

13. SAFRONOV SAID ARTICLE VI CONTAINS PROVISIONS IN US DRAFT.

14. SAFRONOV SAID THAT IN ARTICLE VII THEY TRIED TO CORRESPOND TO US WORDING TO MAXIMUM, BUT THAT A SOVIET LAWYER HAD WRITTEN THE ARTICLE.

15. HECKROTTE THANKED SAFRONOV FOR HIS COMMENTS AND SAID THE US SIDE WOULD HAVE QUESTIONS AT THE NEXT WORKING GROUP
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MEETING.

16. NORDYKE THEN SHOWED SLIFER TO SOVIETS AND ANSWERED QUESTIONS FROM SOVIET EXPERTS. SOVIETS INDICATED SKEPTICISM ABOUT SUCH SIMPLE EQUIPMENT WITHSTANDING PENETRATION BY WATER AT DEPTH OR WITHSTANDING HANDLING IN FIELD. (COMMENT: USDEL HAS IMPRESSION SOVIETS DOUBTED SLIFER SHOWN THEM WAS IDENTICAL TO ONES USED IN FIELD.)

17. WORKING GROUP TWO WILL MEET 3:00 PM OCTOBER 13.

18. IN ORDER TO ANSWER QUESTIONS ASKED BY BEZUMOV, DELEGATION REQUESTS DATA ON TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE RANGES OVER WHICH SANDIA AND LL SLIFERS HAVE BEEN USED IN PAST AS WELL AS INFORMATION ON PROJECTED TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE LIMITS OF

USE FOR CURRENT SLIFER DESIGN.
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